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l. INTRODUCTION 
The most crucial step for the future of the European Union begins 
on January 1, 1999. The cultural conflicts that pervade European 
history will be set aside in favor of collective movement towards en-
hancing the world's largest free trade zone. 1 The creation of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union (EMU) essentially entails uninhibited capital 
movement and a single European currency.2 Several members of the 
European Union (EU), however, will not satisfy the economic criteria 
for inclusion in the EMU and thus, will not qualify for 1999 member-
ship.3 
Theoretically, the nonqualifying countries which intend to become 
members of the EMU will simply have to wait until they are able to 
satisfy the economic preconditions established by the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1992.4 The EMU plans to assist this initially excluded group through 
revitalization of a currency stabilization program called the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) .5 Ideally, through stable exchange rates and 
economic ties to the EMU, the countries outside the EMU will be better 
equipped for moving quickly towards qualification.6 Past European 
attempts at sustained exchange rate stabilization, however, have been 
subject to widespread breakdowns.7 The inherent difficulties associated 
1 See BOFA Expects Europe to Adopt a Single Currency, But EMU's Success Will Face Obstacles, 
Bus. WIRE 21:00,June 26, 1996 [hereinafter BOFA]. 
2 See Matthew]. Eshelman, Comment, The Maastricht Train: Slowing Down For Sharp Curves, 
11 DICK.]. INT'L L. 605, 607-08 (1993). 
3 See Dr. Dieter Kugelmann, The Maastricht Treaty and the Desir;n of a European Federal State, 8 
TEMP. INT'L & CaMP. LJ. 335, 341 (1994); see also Gerard Lyons, Counting the Heavy Cost of a 
Single Currency, EVENING STANDARD, Feb. 21, 1995, available in 1995 WL 11786376. 
4 See Christopher A Whytock, Eurofed: Toward a European System of Central Banks and a 
European Central Bank, 23 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 469, 492 (1992); see also BOFA supra note 1. 
5 See BOFA, supra note 1. 
6 See Lionel Barber, Mad Dash for the Line, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1996, available in 1996 WL 
10614179. 
7 See Dominick Salvatore, The International Monetary System: Past, Present and Future, 62 FoRD-
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with currency control threaten to resurface when an elite corps of 
countries form the planned monetary union and effectively divide 
Europe into those "inside" and those "outside" the EMU.8 
Part I of this Note examines the European Union's first use of an 
exchange rate stabilization system, tracing the development of Euro-
pean cooperation in this area from its beginning in the 1950s to its 
breakdown in 1973. Part II focuses on Europe's second unsuccessful 
attempt to control exchange rate fluctuations through the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism which failed to acljust to the European political and 
economic realignment resulting from German reunification. Part III 
evaluates the potential difficulties of a new ERM that will connect the 
Member States in the EMU with the other EU nations which do not 
initially qualifY. Finally, this Note concludes that the difficulties associ-
ated with the past use of the ERM could resurface and disrupt the 
success, or even the establishment, of the EMU. 
II. PoLITICAL AND EcoNOMIC IssuEs LEADING TO MAASTRICHT: 
PAST UsE OF THE ERM 
The European Union and its predecessor organizations have de-
bated the principle of economic and monetary union for nearly forty 
years.9 The formation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 1951 constituted Europe's first attempt at economic coop-
eration.10 Later attempts at coordination followed quickly in 1957 with 
the introduction of the European Atomic Energy Community (Eura-
tom) and the European Economic Community (EEC) under the Trea-
ty of Rome.U These three Communities were the embryonic stages of 
the current European Union. 12 Furthermore, these early ideas of co-
HAM L. REv. 1975, 1997 (1994); Christopher Young, The Ramifications of the Exchange Rate 
Collapse in Europe: Implications For Monetary Union, 13 B.U. INT'L LJ. 263, 264 (1995). 
8 See How to Shift the Goal Posts: Economic and Monetary Union, EcoNOMIST, Apr. 20, 1996, 
available in 1996 WL 8671807. 
9 See RicHARD CoRBETT, THE 'TREATY oF MAAsTRICHT 2 (1993). 
10 See David O'Keeffe, Current Issues in European Integration, 7 PAcE INT'L L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1995); 
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [hereinafter ECSC], Apr. 
18, 1951, tit. I, art. 1, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 82003 (1993). 
11 See 'TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EuROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY CoMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1957, tit. I, 
art. 1, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 10 [hereinafter EURATOM]; 
TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, pt. I, art. 1, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw, supra note 10, at 810005 [hereinafter EEC 
TREATY]. 
12 See Kugelmann, supra note 3, at 337. 
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operation provided the groundwork for the economic integration en-
visioned for the European Monetary Union. 13 
Initially, the new Communities were composed of six Member States 
which were willing to embark on this unprecedented journey of Euro-
pean cooperation.14 These countries included: Belgium, Federal Re-
public of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands.15 
The economic and political success of the European Community has 
since led to the admission of several other European countries includ-
ing: the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark in 1972; Greece in 
1981; and Spain and Portugal in 1985.16 The accession of Sweden, 
Finland, and Austria took place on january 1, 1995.17 
Economic cooperation was the operating principle behind the for-
mation of the Communities.18 In contrast, unification regarding intra-
European political issues was not yet envisioned in the European Com-
munity.19 Political cooperation, however, still formed a significant un-
derlying premise that later guided many of the European efforts for 
integration. 20 
Just as formal political unity was not considered an immediate goal, 
the EEC treaty did not entail many formal legal obligations for Member 
States regarding economic integration. 21 The Member States were com-
pelled to consult other members on economic policy, but were not 
obligated under the treaty provisions to adopt particular monetary 
measures. 22 Article 103 of the Treaty of Rome stated generally that the 
Member States' conjunctural policies regarding short-term business 
cycles were matters of common concern.23 States were obliged to con-
sult each other on matters in this area. 24 The European Council, how-
ever, was authorized to enact Community-wide measures to assist coop-
eration efforts regarding short-term business cycles.25 
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
!7 See Kugelmann, supra note 3, at 337. 
18 See O'Keeffe, supra note 10, at 3. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See EEC TREATY, pt. III, tit. II, ch. 1, art. 102A. 
22 See id. at art. 103. 
23 See id. 
24 See id. 
25 See Daniel T. Murphy, The European Rate Mechanism: It Continues to Function, But ... , 8 
FLA.j. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1993). 
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Article 104 contained a more specific obligation pertaining to the 
balance of payments.26 This article, however, used the same general 
language of Article 103 in explaining the obligations of the Member 
States.27 The Members were asked to pursue the economic policy need-
ed to ensure the equilibrium of its overall balance of payments and to 
maintain confidence in their respective currencies.28 Obviously, the 
legal implications of such general language were vague. More impor-
tantly, although consultations were required before significant eco-
nomic policies were undertaken, each Member State retained its eco-
nomic and political sovereignty. 29 This freedom of action allowed each 
Member State to acknowledge the Community's concerns while pur-
suing its own national interests.30 
Member State obligations regarding exchange rate stabilization were 
equally vague. 31 Article 107 ( 1), in a manner similar to Article 103, 
called exchange rate maintenance a matter of "common concern. "32 
The scope of obligation was again unclear.33 Member States were mere-
ly authorized under Article 107 (2) to enact countermeasures to protect 
their currencies in the event of independent and nationalist state 
action. 34 Thus, the initial steps toward economic integration were ten-
tative and based solely on cooperation rather than obligation. 35 
As the ideas of cooperation gained momentum, however, the prin-
ciple of economic unification became a formal Community objective 
during the Hague Summit of Community Heads of Government in 
1969.36 At that time, the EU envisioned economic integration as the 
convergence of economic and monetary policies, without reference to 
a single currency.37 The primary method of implementing these eco-
nomic policy agreements was to restrain exchange rate fluctuations in 
a fashion similar to the Bretton Woods System of International Mone-
tary Management.38 The EU acknowledged consistent currency values 
26 See EEC TREATY, at art. 104. 
27 See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See Murphy, supra note 25, at 7. 
30 See id. 
3! SeeEEC TREATY, at art. 107(1). 
32 See id. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. at art. 107(2). 
35 See Murphy, supra note 25, at 7. 
36 See CORBETT, supra note 9, at 2. 
37 See id. 
38 See Salvatore, supra note 7, at 1977. The Bretton Woods System of International Monetary 
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as an essential element in creating a monetary union among its mem-
bers.39 
The goal of monetary union was formally announced in the Werner 
Report of 1970.40 The report proposed the establishment of an EMU 
by 1980.41 Efforts to maintain stable exchange rates, however, quickly 
dissipated upon the failure of the Bretton Woods System.42 The catalyst 
for this worldwide exchange rate breakdown was the rigidity of the 
fixed rate policy under Bretton Woods and the currency crisis created 
by OPEC's oil price increase in 1973.43 
With full economic sovereignty, the countries of the EU were able 
to protect themselves individually against economic shocks of this kind 
by devaluing their currencies.44 Acting independently, these nations 
were able to achieve greater manufacturing growth and increased 
international competitiveness.45 The currency devaluations, however, 
did result in a breakdown of exchange rate stability and put the idea 
of monetary union on hold for several years. 46 
III. EuROPE's SECOND ATTEMPT AT ExcHANGE RATE STABILITY 
A. The European Monetary System 
In 1978, the Member States returned to the issue of monetary union 
and established the European Monetary System (EMS).47 The new 
program embraced many of the ideas of the previous unification at-
tempt.48 Exchange rate stabilization was again identified as crucial, 
resulting in the formal establishment of the ERM.49 The central ex-
Management was set up following World War II in response to interwar instability of the exchange 
markets. The Bretton Woods Agreement established a fixed exchange rate program among the 
parties to the agreement. This system of exchange rate maintenance collapsed as a result of the 
international imbalance of payments among leading industrial nations and the disproportionate 
influx of capital. See id. at 1975-77. 
59 See David P. Valenti, Currency Unification in the European Economic Community: The Mechanics, 
Politics, and Probability for Success, 28 INT'L LAw. 1039, 1046 (1994). 
40 See CoRBETT, supra note 9, at 2. 
41 See id. 
42 See Salvatore, supra note 7, at 1977. 
45 See id. 
44 See Eshelman, supra note 2, at 612-13. 
45 See id. at 613. 
46 See CoRBETT, supra note 9, at 2-3. 
47 See id. at 3. 
48 See Murphy, supra note 25, at 12. 
49 See CoRBETT, supra note 9, at 3. 
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change rates of the various EU countries were assigned fixed margins 
between which their currencies could fluctuate, with realignment of 
those margins subject to common agreement. 5° Furthermore, the ECU 
was introduced as a composite currency to be used as the denominator 
of Community transactions. 51 
Voluntary participation in this version of the ERM was limited, but 
it lasted fourteen years in its original form.52 The results were consid-
ered a success. 53 The realignment of national exchange rates decreased 
in frequency over the subsequent twelve-year period.54 Inflation and 
interest rate differentials also declined.55 Still, the lack of universal 
participation in the ERM and the outright opposition of such key 
players as the United Kingdom, sidelined serious discussion of single 
currency development within EMS borders.56 
The growing interdependence of European goods and services mar-
kets due to the relative success of the ERM and the pending effects of 
the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), prompted a study into the need 
for a single currency.57 The SEA was an attempt to put the issue of 
monetary and economic union back on the European discussion table 
and provided guidelines for a single European internal market.58 A 
single market hinged upon the abandonment of all internal controls 
on intra-European capital flow.59 
The effects of the removal of trade barriers under the SEA, however, 
would not be fully realized untill992.60 At this point, increased capital 
movement was expected to make management of exchange rates more 
difficult while, at the same time, fostering Member State interdepen-
dency. 51 These concerns caused the European Parliament to examine 
the costs of separate currencies on an interdependent Europe. 52 The 
50 See id. 
51 See Murphy, supra note 25, at 15-16. The ECU is a basket of currencies which consists of 
stated portions of each Member State's currency. It has no intrinsic value of its own. Its value is 
derived from the fluctuating relationships of the member currencies to the U.S. dollar. See id. 
52 See CoRBETT, supra note 9, at 3. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. 
56 See id. 
57 See O'Keeffe, supra note 10, at 5-6. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. at 6. 
60 See id. 
61 See CoRBETT, supra note 9, at 3. 
62 See id. 
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results suggested a total cost (including transaction costs, hedging costs 
against exchange rate changes, maintenance of separate reserves, and 
reliance on the dollar for pricing in international trade) of 30 billion 
ECU per year. 63 
B. The Delors Committee and Monetary Union Under the Maastricht 
Treaty 
In light of the cost analysis of competing currencies, the European 
Parliament commissioned the Delors Committee in june 1988, to study 
the issue and propose a comprehensive plan for EMU.64 The Commit-
tee, consisting of the twelve central bank governors and chaired by 
Jacques Delors, submitted its report in April 1989.65 The findings of 
the Delors Report eventually formed the basis of the Maastricht Trea-
ty.66 The Delors Report discussed the basic principles behind the pro-
posed EMU and suggested numerous steps for its implementation.67 
The Delors Report drew an important distinction between the 
EMU's common goals of economic and monetary union.68 Monetary 
union was to entail irreversible convertibility of currencies and would 
require the creation of new community institutions such as the Euro-
pean Central Bank.69 In contrast, economic union was to require bi-lat-
eral cooperation between Member States regarding fiscal and mone-
tary policies.70 Implicit in the creation of centralized institutions was 
the necessary cessation of significant economic policy decisionmaking 
power by individual Member States.71 Since this type of coordination 
was unprecedented in European relations, the Delors Report recom-
mended a gradual three-step process for economic integration.72 
The Delors Report's proposal for a three-phase process toward EMU 
required new agreements among the Member States.73 The first stage 
of the development plan proceeded without treaty authorization be-
63 See id. 
64 See PETER B. KENEN, EMU AFTER MAASTRICHT 8 (1992). 
65 See id. Jacques Delors, of France, was president of the European Community Commission. 
I d. 
66 See id. at 10. 
67 See id. 
68 See CoRBETT, supra note 9, at 4. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See Valenti, supra note 39, at 1047-48. 
72 See Whytock, supra note 4, at 489. 
7S See id. at 485-86. 
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cause it was only prepatory in nature. 74 The following two stages, 
however, were inoperable without formal agreements by the Member 
States because substantive and universal cooperation was required. 75 
Mter several years of Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) and oth-
er preparations, the European Council finally reached conclusions on 
all outstanding issues regarding European monetary union.76 On Feb-
ruary 7, 1992, the Foreign and Finance Ministers of all the Member 
States signed the Treaty on European Union (known as the Maastricht 
Treaty) in Maastricht, Netherlands.77 
When the Maastricht Treaty was actually ratified at the end of 1992, 
it had embraced most of the principles and ideas expressed in the 
Delors Report. 78 Specifically, the Maastricht Treaty adopted the three-
phase guideline, described by the Delors Committee, for instituting 
EMU.79 Stage I aimed to remove financial obstacles to economic inte-
gration, such as trade barriers, restraints on capital movement, and 
exchange rate instability.80 Implicitly, the adoption of this portion of 
the Maastricht Treaty was expected to signifY European political resolve 
as well as establish an EMU "mindset" among the Member States.81 
Stage II began on January 1, 1994.82 It is a transitional phase that 
prepares for EMU by promoting the general coordination of monetary 
policies and cooperation between the Member States.83 Most impor-
tantly, the second stage encourages each Member State to strive toward 
the economic convergence criteria set out by the Maastricht Treaty.84 
The Maastricht Treaty established the criteria in order to ensure that 
all new members have similarly operating economies at the time of 
integration.85 
The convergence criteria requires each Member State to meet spe-
cified targets for inflation, interest rates, budget deficits, and currency 
74 See CoRBETT, supra note 9, at 4. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. at 5. 
77 See 'TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, tit. I, art. A, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN 
UNION LAw, supra note 10 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. 
78 See KENEN, supra note 64, at 14. 
79 See Whytock, supra note 4, at 489-90. 
80 See KENEN, supra note 64, at 12-13. 
8I See CoRBETT, supra note 9, at 4. 
82 See Kugelmann, supra note 3, at 340. 
83 See Whytock, supra note 4, at 490-91. 
84 See Young, supra note 7, at 270-71. 
85 See Larry Elliott, Ewnomics: The Single Currency, GuARDIAN, Jan. 9, 1996, available in 1996 
WL 4003827. 
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stability.86 The European Council will determine, by no later than 
December 31, 1996, whether a majority of Member States satisfY the 
requirements.87 If a majority is found, then a date for Stage III will be 
set. 88 If no date for the beginning of Stage III has been set by December 
1996, Stage III will begin automatically on january 1, 1999.89 
The third and final stage of the EMU involves the substitution of the 
single European currency for the national currencies of the qualifYing 
nations.90 During Stage III, the politically independent European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB), and its banking network under the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB), will be fully operational and charged with 
implementing the monetary policy of the Union.91 It will also regulate 
the official foreign reserves of the Member States, and promote the 
smooth operation of payment systems.92 
C. Exchange Rate Collapse in 1993 
Shortly after ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the euphoria of 
European unification was undercut by the collapse of the ERM in 
August 1993.93 German reunification efforts since 1989 had caused a 
substantial breakdown in European exchange rates as Germany at-
tempted to pay for its reunification through governmental borrowing 
rather than by raising taxes.94 The resultant deficit spending created a 
reactionary increase in inflation due to increased German demand for 
goods and services.95 The Bundesbank responded by raising short-term 
86 See Whytock, supra note 4, at 491. Each Member State vying for participation in the EMU 
must meet these criteria: 
1) price stability-measured by the proximity of inflation rates. 
2) soundness of government financial positions-measured by the absence of "excessive" 
governmental budget deficits. 
3) maintainance of exchange rates within the ERM margins for two years without derogation. 
4) durability of convergence-measured by the proximity of long term interest rate levels. See 
Michael Abbey & Nicholas Bromfield, A Practitioner's Guide to the Maastricht Treaty, 15 MICH. J. 
INT'L L. 1329, 1341 (1994). 
87 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 77, at art. 109j(4). 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 ld. at art. 1091(4). The rate of currency conversion, as it pertains to the individual qualifying 
countries, will be irrevocably fixed upon the unanimous vote of the participating Member States. 
/d. 
9! See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 77, at art. 105(2). 
92 See id. 
93 See Young, supra note 7, at 264. 
94 See Monetary Crisis: Causes of the Crisis, EuR. CoMMUNITY L. & Bus. REP., Report Sept.-Oct. 
1992, at 6 [hereinafter Monetary Crisis]. 
95 See Young, supra note 7, at 277. 
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interest rates to support the deutschmark.96 Subsequent German refus-
als to make a significant cut in interest rates demonstrated that Ger-
man national interests took precedence over the "common concerns" 
of the Union.97 
The comparatively high German interest rates allowed the deutsch-
mark to appreciate rapidly against all other European currencies.98 The 
rate of appreciation shook the narrow fluctuation bands (2.25%) un-
der ERM to the brink of collapse in September 1992.99 On September 
17, the English pound was unable to maintain its currency position 
and Prime Minister John Major withdrew the United Kingdom from 
the ERM. 100 Shortly thereafter, the Italian lira dropped out as well. 101 
After a brief period of stability, the financial disparity between the 
deutschmark and other currencies was exploited by speculators in the 
currency markets. 102 On july 30, 1993, market investors started a "run" 
on the French franc by exchanging francs for the more valuable Ger-
man currency. 103 The depletion in French exchange reserves forced 
the EU Finance Ministers to widen the currency bands to allow France 
and others the opportunity to defend their currencies.104 The Ministers 
further decided that from that day forward the EU currencies could 
fluctuate fifteen percent above or below their assigned levels. 105 Thus, 
under such a structure, the ERM no longer constituted an effective 
currency stabilization program. 106 
96 See Monetary Crisis, supra note 94, at 6. 
97 See Young, supra note 7, at 275, 278. 
98 See Monetary Crisis, supra note 94, at 7. 
99 See Young, supra note 7, at 276. 
100 See CORBETT, supra note 9, at xxi. 
101 See id. 
102 See Monetary Crisis, supra note 94, at 7. 
I03 See Young, supra note 7, at 277. 
104 See id. 
105 See id. at 278. 
106 See id. 
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IV. PROJECTED OBSTACLES FOR EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 
A. The Convergence Criteria and the Temptation for Manipulation 
The second breakdown of the ERMin twenty years does not bode 
well for the future of the EMU. Although the conversion to a single 
currency will eliminate exchange rate concerns within the EMU, a new 
ERM will continue to link the nonqualifYing countries to both the EMU 
and each other.107 To date, it is uncertain which Member States will 
meet the convergence criteria.108 In fact, the current criteria, if strictly 
adhered to, could leave significant economic players out of the proc-
ess.109 
Thus far, the most difficult criterion for the Member States to satisfY 
has been the requirement that each nation's budget deficit constitute 
no more than three per cent of its gross domestic product. 110 As of 
September 1996, only Denmark, Ireland, and Luxembourg met all of 
the Maastricht criteria for membership.m Continental Europe's rela-
tive economic progress in 1997, and its anticipated continued growth 
are welcome concepts, but the gradual nature of such growth is in-
sufficient to make up for Europe's lacklustre economic performance 
and high levels of unemployment since 1992.112 Both conditions have 
contributed to Member States' difficulties in constraining budgetary 
spending.113 Even with anticipated economic growth in Europe, the 
IMF predicted that a "majority of EU countries, including Germany 
and France, [would] fail the three percent test [if given] in 1997."114 
Strict adherence to the convergence criteria, however, is question-
able.115 The difficulty of meeting the economic preconditions makes 
the criteria susceptible to manipulation in an effort to include more 
members. 116 Article 104(c) of the Maastricht Treaty is an enforcement 
I07 See L. Barber, supra note 6. 
IOS See Kugelmann, supra note 3, at 341. 
109 See How to Shift the Goalposts: Economic and Monetary Union, EcoNOMIST, Apr. 20, 1996, 
available in 1996 WL 8671807 [hereinafter How to Shift the Goalposts]. 
IIO See L. Barber, supra note 6. 
III See id. 
112 See The Clouds Clear Over Europe, EcoNOMIST, Sept. 27, 1997, at 84; Patrick Donovan, Money 
Talk, GUARDIAN, Apr. 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL 4018133; 
113 See L. Barber, supra note 6. 
II4 How to Shift the Goalposts, supra note 109. 
II5 See Joshua M. Wepman, Note, Article 104(C) of the Maastrict Treaty and European Monetary 
Union: Does Ireland Hold the Key to Success?, 19 B.C. lNT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 247, 253 (1996). 
II6 See id. at 256; L. Barber, supra note 6. 
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provision for the budget deficit criterion.117 The article authorizes the 
European Commission to issue recommendations and possible sanc-
tions to Member States who create excessive governmental debt. 118 
When Ireland's economy deviated from the criteria, however, the 
Commission chose to ignore the transgression but issued formal rep-
rimands to other nations who also failed. 119 The Commission over-
looked Ireland's difficulty in meeting the criteria and instead focused 
solely on its economic progress.120 Paragraph 2(b) of Article 104(C) 
states that the Commission "shall examine compliance with budgetary 
discipline on the basis of ... whether the ratio of government debt to 
gross domestic product exceeds a reference value, unless the ratio is 
sufficiently diminished and approaching the reference value at a satis-
factory pace. "121 
The general language of this treaty provision implicitly authorizes 
the Commission to use its discretion in issuing sanctions. 122 The Com-
mission's decision regarding Ireland, however, was widely criticized 
because other EU countries were making progress as well, but only 
Ireland was excused. 123 Commentators wondered whether "the conver-
gence criteria require an end result smack on target ... or whether a 
country will be admitted to stage three if it is simply on a trend moving 
toward them. "124 
The purpose of the criteria is to ensure that each economy entering 
the EMU operates in a similar fashion. 125 The European Central Bank 
must be able to centralize its monetary and economic policy rather 
than cater to the specific needs of a nation. 126 Manipulation of the 
criteria will only hurt the prospect of cohesive economic decisions.127 
It is doubtful, however, that the EMU will even come to fruition if 
serious manipulation of the criteria is allowed.128 
117 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 77, at art. 104(c). 
118 See id. 
119 See Wepman, supra note 115, at 255. 
120 See id. 
121 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 77, at art. 104(c) (2b). 
122 See Wepman, supra note 115, at 256. 
123 See id. at 255. 
124 See id. at 253 (quoting Kevin Muehring, EC EMU's Bitter Medicine - Tough Rules May 
Discourage Membership, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Apr. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Li-
brary, Allnws File). 
125 See Elliott, supra note 85. 
126 See Kugelmann, supra note 3, at 343-44. 
127 See id. 
128 See Abbey & Bromfield, supra note 86, at 1336. 
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Germany, as the economic leader of Europe, already demonstrated 
that it places its national economic interests above those of the Euro-
pean Union when it refused to lower interest rates in 1992.129 It is 
therefore improbable that Germany will allow fiscally irresponsible 
countries to join the EMU and thereby risk its solid currency position 
for the sake of the Community. 130 Since its widely criticized decision 
regarding Ireland, the EU Commission has vowed to interpret the 
criteria strictly. 131 Another failure to do so could cause Germany and 
others to question the benefits of membership. 132 
B. Historic Problems With the ERM and Their Potential for Resurfacing 
Regardless of how the criteria are interpreted, certain Member States 
will be excluded from EMU in 1999.133 Thus, from the beginning "the 
drive for monetary unity [will] split Europe if some Member States 
[are] in and others out initially. "134 These "outsiders" will be encour-
aged to join a new ERM at that time.135 Due to United Kingdom and 
Swedish insistence, however, nonqualifYing countries will not be com-
pelled to participate in the ERM. 136 
In relation to the EMU, the new ERM will operate much as it did in 
the past with its attendant problems and benefits. 137 Its role will con-
tinue to entail minimizing fluctuation in exchange rates among the 
nonqualifYing countries and the EMU as well as exchange rates be-
tween the nonqualifYing countries themselves. 138 By joining the ERM 
each country agrees to an obligation under the Treaty to keep the 
market value of its currency within the established fifteen percent 
fluctuation bands. 139 The obligation materializes only upon the need 
129 See Monetary Crisis, supra note 94, at 8. 
130 See Young, supra note 7, at 274-75. 
l3l See William Rees-Mogg, The Case for European Monetary Union, TIMES (London), Nov. 27, 
1995, available in 1996 WL 11874971. 
132 See Abbey & Bromfield, supra note 86, at 1336. 
133 See L. Barber, supra note 6. 
134 See George Melloan, Eurocrats See the Euro as Their Holy Grai~ WALL ST.]., Sept. 23, 1996, 
at A2l. 
135 See L. Barber, supra note 6. 
136 See How to Shift the Goalposts, supra note 109. 
137 See id. 
138 See Murphy, supra note 25, at 19. 
139 See Finland Moves to Link Money With the EU, CALGARY HERALD, Oct. 14, 1996, available in 
1996 WL 5102522. 
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for governmental intervention regarding exchange reserves.140 As prov-
en in the past, the enforceability of this obligation is questionable.141 
Other substantive and logistical problems from past experience with 
ERM could also resurface. Although none of the problems of the past 
have yet destroyed the economic and political framework of the Euro-
pean Union, their disruptive nature may delay crucial'memberships 
of significant economic players into the EMU, undermine European 
unity, and disrupt currency markets and trade growth.142 
Europe is currently faced with three, almost simultaneous institu-
tional and economic shocks.143 The freedom of capital movement and 
the transition to monetary union and enlargement present cumulative 
disruptive problems for European economies because of inevitable dis-
parity in distribution costs and benefits across Europe. 144 The oil crisis 
in the early 1970s and German reunification efforts in the 1990s each 
undermined Europe's attempts to stabilize exchange rates.145 Without 
solid leadership and cooperation within the Union, these obstacles 
could collapse the exchange rate system again.146 
Although it is difficult to predict the exact nature of the next eco-
nomic shock, the European economies are increasingly more vulner-
able to such shocks due to the economic strain of meeting the conver-
gence criteria. 147 Germany, France, Spain, and Belgium, which have 
had difficulty meeting the Maastricht budget deficit target, attempted 
to tighten their national budgets and often secured deep spending cuts 
in order to qualify.148 Spain, if necessary, threatened to freeze public 
sector wages in 1997 to achieve the three percent budget limit.149 
140 See How to Shift the Goalposts, supra note 109. 
141 See L. Barber, supra note 6. EU may lack the political will to enforce a nation's obligation 
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Since even the leading European economies are having difficulty 
meeting the criteria, the countries, who do not initially qualifY for the 
EMU and then experience economic difficulty, will face the possibility 
of even further delayed membership. 150 Large-scale spending cuts or 
other deficit reduction measures could stimulate unemployment, infla-
tion, and slow economic growth. 151 In fact, Italy and the United King-
dom experienced economic expansion only after dropping out of the 
ERMin 1992.152 UNCTAD senior economist Yilmuz Alcyuz argues that 
such independent growth illustrates the need for flexible exchange 
rates for economic stimulation. 153 
Political backlash follows quickly on the heels of economic strain.154 
European governments, such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal, which are 
attempting to reduce government spending are faced with public out-
cry over social spending cuts.155 Prime Minister Antonio Gutteres of 
Portugal articulated the pressure felt by those countries struggling to 
make membership stating, "[w]e want Portugal at the political center 
of Europe, where decisions are made, not out on the edge where they 
have to be obeyed. "156 Repeated cutbacks, however, may trigger political 
unrest in certain Member States which, in turn, may usher in a wave 
of nationalist isolationism.157 
A feeling of imposed isolation will undoubtedly result from the 
division of Europe into those countries participating in the EMU and 
those whose membership will be delayed.158 This condition presents 
concerns regarding the initial effectiveness of centralized monetary 
policy. 159 As previously discussed, central control of economic policy 
removes the ability of individual nations to devalue their currencies in 
order to stimulate growth. 160 The exclusion of fiscally troubled nations 
such as Italy or Spain could provoke currency devaluations that make 
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products from those countries less expensive as compared to those of 
the "insiders. "161 Such trade imbalances could, in turn, cause members 
of the EMU to impose defensive trade barriers, thus promoting further 
disuni ty.162 
The climate which surrounded the 1997 general election in the 
United Kingdom illustrated the divergent views regarding membership 
in the EMU .163 Both the Conservative and Labour Parties shrank from 
commitment to the EMU during the campaign period.164 The political 
consequences of a decision either way threatened to be disastrous for 
either party. 165 Under the treaty, Britain is supposed to decide whether 
it will join the initial single currency group by the end of 1997.166 The 
assumption is that it will not. 167 The political pressure building in the 
United Kingdom already demonstrates the vast potential for isolation-
ism if economic strain were to disrupt European economies.168 
Finally, the world currency markets lurk menacingly beneath the 
surface. 169 "If the markets perceive that monetary union will again be 
botched, traders are likely to bash such currencies as the Spanish 
peseta, the Portuguese escudo, and the French franc, whose parity with 
the mark holds the European system of managed exchange rates to-
gether."170 Currency speculation could also disrupt the ERM once the 
initial EMU members are determined. 171 Since the exchange rates of 
the participating currencies will not be set against the deutschmark 
until 1998, market investors will be speculating on the rates of ex-
change and could thereby threaten the established fluctuation margins 
as they did in 1993.172 
V. CONCLUSION 
Europe's efforts to control exchange rates among its members have 
been relatively successful. From its decades of experience, Europe has 
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learned that the rigidity of fixed rates and narrow fluctuation bands 
cannot cope with economic shocks. The creation of a single currency 
for a select group of EU Member States will eliminate exchange rate 
concerns among those members. The exclusion of other European 
nations from the single currency area, however, and the continued 
application of the ERM for these excluded countries will promote the 
historic difficulties associated with managed exchange rates. 
There are a number of important consequences which would flow 
from a post-1999 breakdown of the ERM. First, countries outside of the 
EMU would have to delay their bid for membership further because a 
breakdown of ERM signifies inflationary problems, thus undermining 
a nation's attempt to satisfY the Maastricht criteria. Second, a break-
down would severely undercut the already fragile political will of some 
Member States and promote disunity of purpose. Lastly, the coopera-
tive links among European nations would be irrevocably disrupted if 
a breakdown created drastic trade imbalances and currency specula-
tion. 
The very existence of a monetary union in Europe depends precari-
ously on the early stages of the EMU and the relationship between 
those "inside" and those "outside" of it. If several of the economic and 
political concerns expressed in this Note surface before a monetary 
union is solidified, the anticipated benefits of the EMU will never be 
realized. 
Stephen F. Mahoney 
